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Deregulation in the airline industry has forced full service
airlines to change their strategies in order to respond to increasing
challenges. In this paper, an econometric analysis of the possible
determinants of economic performance of full service airlines after
liberalisation has been carried out. A fixed effects model was used
and the performance of ten European full service airlines has been
analysed over a period of 11 years. Variables considered in this
analysis were the number and type of aircraft in the fleet, the
number and type of destinations, investments, number of employees
and alliances. The analysis suggests that full service airlines should
adjust fleet composition and re-organise operations on their routes
in order to react to the increasingly competitive environment. [JEL
Classification: C23, L25, L93]
1. - Introduction
Restrictive domestic and international regulations have histor-
ically shaped the structure of the airline industry and have had a
strong impact on airlines’ performance. Regulations defined,
firstly, the geographic markets that could be served by the airlines
and, secondly, the type of aircraft that could be used to provide
services (Williams, 2002; Doganis, 2002). More crucially, travellers
grew accustomed to high airline fares, which were not related to
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costs. Market mechanisms were frustrated and the industry was
far from competitive. Indeed, before deregulation, airlines had
been running their businesses in a protected environment (in
particular outside the US), where state-owned airlines were
commonplace and enjoyed stronger protection (Neven - Röller,
1996; Tretheway, 2004; Doganis, 2006).
Since 1978 — when the US began deregulating their
commercial airline industry — traditional carriers have experienced
fundamental changes,1 especially as a result of transformations that
have occurred in a few key areas, and these changes have influenced
the airlines’ operations in recent years (DT, 1990; Bruning, 1991;
TRB, 1991; Borenstein, 1992; CAA, 1998; Kahn, 2003). Formal
deregulation did have an impact on subsequent developments, as
it made constraints and national borders less stringent.
Nevertheless, substantial changes happened later, by shifting
patterns of demand in the industry, coupled with external
innovations such as the growth in take-up of internet usage. 
For the first two decades of deregulation, in fact, its impact
on the airline industry was weak (Marín, 1998; Ng - Seabright,
2001; Schnell, 2004). Demand was not driving supply. Airlines
could focus on revenue-side strategies and, notably, introduce so-
phisticated global distribution systems, enhance revenue manage-
ment and offer frequent flyer programmes. These actions helped
bring about demand segmentation, protect revenues and avoid
pressures on the level of costs. However, during the last decade,
the development of the low-cost airline business, widespread ac-
cess to internet by travellers and a general reduction in compa-
nies’ willingness to pay high airline fares (for their employees’
journeys) have strengthened the impact of deregulation (Dresner
- Windle, 1999; Bhatia, 2004; Franke, 2004; Belobaba - Gorin,
2004; Gillen - Morrison, 2005).2
The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the eco-
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1 Over time, new deregulation initiatives have been implemented in the US
and internationally; in particular, European countries started deregulation pro-
grammes in 1983 (EC, 1999; DEMPSEY P.S., 2001).
2 BHATIA K.K. (2004) notes that, in the US market, 80% of an airline revenues
were provided by demand of time-sensitive travellers (even if they accounted for
only 20% of passengers).
nomic literature that empirically investigates the performance of
the so-called full service airlines (FSAs). In particular, this paper
presents an econometric analysis of a few possible determinants
of the economic performance of FSAs during the last decade. A
fixed effects model has been used in order to test the impact of
investments and supply-oriented strategies (aimed at widening the
fleet as well as increasing flight frequencies) for 10 European FSAs
- i.e. traditional flag carriers. 
Our findings suggest that, in order to maintain competit-
iveness, FSAs should adjust their fleet composition and re-organise
their routes, which should be more geared towards long-haul
destinations.
The paper is organised in the following sections: Section 2
describes data and methods of analysis; Section 3 shows the
results obtained by several estimations of a fixed effects model; a
discussion of results together with further considerations conclude
the paper in Section 4.
2. - Data and Methods of Analysis
This article aims at studying the changes in the business
strategies of FSAs in the aftermath of liberalisation. 
Previous studies into the challenges brought about by
liberalisation had to deal with several methodological issues such
as data availability and their comparability. International generalis-
ations have been particularly difficult so far because of a lack of
data (Oum - Yu, 1998; Schefczyk, 1993).
The increase in the number of observations and, consequently,
in the degrees of freedom can be achieved by means of a model
using time-series cross-section data.3 Moreover, with time-series
cross-section data it is possible to account for population
heterogeneity. Since variables representing the latter are typically
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3 According to HSIAO C. (1986), «by utilizing information on both the
intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated, one
is better able to control in a more natural way for the effect of missing or
unobserved variables».
not measurable and are unobservable, the problem of hetero-
geneity might be solved by adding unit-specific dummy variables
that affect the outcome in which we are interested.
A fixed effects model, known as “covariance model”, allows
both individual and/or time effects to be taken into account by
adding dummy variables for cross-section units and/or time-
periods. 
The fixed effects model can be specified as follows:
Yit = (α + δi) + Xit β + εit
where the deterministic part of the equation is composed of a
constant term and an individual effect δi (the subscript i indicates
the unit considered. The subscript t, instead, represents time). The
estimator applied in this context is obtained by OLS on a “within”
transformed model, that considers for each component the
deviation from the mean (Greene, 2003).
The analysis was carried out observing a sample made up of
10 European full service airlines operating domestic and internat-
ional routes. The FSAs considered are: Aer Lingus, Air France,
Alitalia, British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Olympic Airlines,
SN Airlines and Swiss (other European FSAs could not be included
in the sample due to insufficient data).
The FSA business model typically favours a high level of
service (compared to the low-cost model) and the creation of a
large service bundle (in-flight entertainment, meals, drinks, large
numbers of ticketing counters at the hub, etc.) to maximise the
revenue yields from business and long-haul travellers (Gillen -
Morrison, 2005; O’Connell - Williams, 2005).4
The low-cost carrier (LCC) business model, instead, is based
on a no-frills and low-fare approach, where the ability of the
airline management to minimize costs to provide a well-defined
type of service is crucial (Bergantino, 2006). This business model
brought about a reduction in costs to about 60% less than costs
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4 GILLEN D. - MORRISON W.G. (2005) stress how this circumstance helped to
build the market at a time when air travel was more restricted than it is today.
incurred by incumbent airlines, especially in areas such as labour
costs, where LCCs have a marked advantage compared to FSAs
(Doganis, 2006). Moreover, LCCs have developed new routes
(previously not flown by FSAs) and usually fly to less congested
airports than those traditionally used by FSAs — a business choice
which helps LCCs to keep airport fees at lower levels (Piacentino,
2006). 
On the revenue side, LCCs seek high load factors (i.e. the
proportion of passengers carried to seats available)5 and this
objective is fostered by a business model that, given the cost
advantage, has enabled LCCs to offer fares at much lower levels
than those offered by FSAs. As a result, the creation of new
markets and booming traffic growth (between 3 and 4 times the
previous levels on some routes) could be observed. However, as
LCCs have grown, they have increasingly overlapped with markets
served by FSAs, hence determining a substantial change in the
airline industry (Mason, 2005; Morrell, 2005).6
The 10 FSAs selected for our analysis have been considered
over an 11 year period, from 1995 to 2005. The data was collect-
ed using the Amadeus database, which provides detailed infor-
mation about European listed companies. However, the panel is
unbalanced, because for some airlines it was not possible to ob-
tain observations for the whole 11 year period. A couple of FSAs
have experienced bankruptcy, but they re-started operations after
a period of restructuring and re-organisation, using a new com-
pany brand (for instance, Sabena is now operating as SN Brus-
sels Airlines, and Swissair as Swiss). For other companies (e.g.
British Airways and Lufthansa) some observations, in particular
in 1995, were not available in the main data source.
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5 FSAs such as British Airways and Swiss have shown a preference for lower
load factors than their competitors, in order to offer their customers a higher level
of comfort in the aircraft and better in-flight service, as well as to concentrate on
customers with high willingness to pay for air travel.
6 Since the focus of this research is a micro-analysis of the permanent
structural shift experienced in the market after the start of the process of
liberalisation, external shocks (e.g. SARS, war and terrorist attacks) that might
have had at least a short-term effect on airlines’ performances have been
neglected. 
Descriptive statistics about these companies are shown in
Table 1a and Table 1b.
Overall, there is a great heterogeneity in the sample: compa-
nies differ in their level of revenues (represented by Earnings Be-
fore Interests and Taxes - EBIT), investment strategies (measured
by total and fixed assets), number of passengers carried per year
(going from 2,341.8 of Sabena SN in 2002, up to 48,255.5 carried
by Lufthansa in 2004) and number of destinations, especially over-
seas (a small airline such as Aer Lingus has only 4 overseas des-
tinations on average, while Lufthansa has always scheduled a high
number of destinations, with a peak of 206 overseas routes served
in 2002).
Apart from data reported in the tables above, data about fleet
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TABLE 1.a
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Observed variable No. of Mean Std. dev. Min Max
observ.
FSAs 110 5.5 2,885 1 10
Year 110 2000 3,176 1995 2005
EBIT 97 -722,558 9,626,931 -9.43e+07 3,994,197
Total assets 96 1.28e+07 3.29e+07 51,064 2.37e+08
Fixed assets 96 7,715,304 2.08e+07 2,104 1.58e+08
No. of employees 95 30,511.64 28,418.64 299 102,722
Passengers (thousands) 97 20,509.3 13,234.42 2,341.8 48,255.4
ASK (millions)a 97 63,193.98 46,775 5,419.3 168,259.7
RPK (millions)b 107 45,481.1 35,484.96 2,606.1 118,889.7
Passengers load factor 97 78.012 67.926 48.1 738
Total load factor 97 66.005 7.952 39.4 80
No. of aircraft (Airbus) 100 46.05 46.733 0 171
No. of aircraft (Boeing) 100 59.12 61.680 0 245
No. of aircraft (others) 100 43.36 41.355 0 176
Total no. of aircraft 100 148.53 102.293 29 409
Fleet heterogeneity 100 0.73 0.446 0 1
No. of dest. (domestic) 90 17.55 13.93 1 60
No. of dest. (intra-European) 90 56.73 26.802 21 128
No. of destinations (overseas) 90 58.92 50.002 3 206
Total no. of destinations 90 133.21 77.542 29 357
Alliances 100 0.66 0.476 0 1
a Available Seat Kilometres (ASK), that is the number of seats available for
passengers (given the fleet), times the distance flown.
b Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK), that is the number of passengers on
board who have bought a ticket, times the number of kilometres flown.
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composition are of some interest: some of the airlines tend to
deploy a wide variety of aircraft, while others use only a few types
of aircraft in their fleet. On average, Boeing aircraft are the most
used by FSAs. Nevertheless, the number of Airbus aircraft has
been increasing in the last year for almost all the companies (KLM
and Olympic are exceptions to this). In Table 1a, the “fleet
heterogeneity” dummy variable indicates if FSAs have in their fleet
different aircraft types (Airbus, Boeing or others). Fleet hetero-
geneity is likely to involve higher costs for the airline, particularly
in the areas of maintenance and labour. Significantly, LCCs tend
to use only one type of aircraft. Although Boeing and Airbus have
categories of aircraft that can be considered as generic substitutes,
the cost of operating different aircraft models can differ (e.g. there
are aircraft with two, three or four engines, the latter burning
more fuel).
After liberalisation, alliances among airlines have become
significant and more widespread. For example, KLM has always
been involved in strategic alliances. Olympic Airlines, on the other
hand, has never been part of any alliance. Most alliances have
been created since 1996: Lufthansa joined Star Alliance in 1997;
British Airways and Iberia joined One World in 1998 (which Aer
Lingus entered in 1999). Air France has been a part of Skyteam
since 2000 and Alitalia since 2001. Other FSAs have followed
different patterns: Sabena SN and Swiss have been part of the
Qualifier alliance until 2000-2001 but, probably because of financ-
ial problems, they have withdrawn from that alliance. 
Some authors (Negandhi - Ganguly, 1986; Backx et al., 2002)
have emphasised how financial performance has to be considered
jointly with efficiency (both organisational efficiency and in-flight
equipment efficiency) to evaluate company success, in particular
when the company is partly state owned. However, financial
performance is arguably the most important dimension of a firm’s
performance, especially in a liberalised market with increasing
competition. 
In order to test the impact of liberalisation of the air transport
market on economic performance, a proxy related to FSAs’ level
of profits (measured by EBIT) has been regressed on a set of
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variables, which represent the policies adopted to increase supply
and keep down costs (i.e. changes in investment policies, as
measured by the level of fixed assets; changes in the destinations
served; fleet modifications; variations in labour costs — due to
employee numbers — and corporate strategic variations, e.g.
alliances). 
It would be interesting to include other strategic variables, in
order to analyse the impact of airline connection strategies (“hub-
and-spoke” or “point-to-point”) on quality and customer satisfact-
ion. In this study we simply included a dummy variable for
alliance agreements.
Since the present analysis focuses on individual economic per-
formances, it does not take into account the impact of macroec-
onomic factors in determining a modification in the market frame-
work after liberalisation. 
The main objective of this study is, thus, to test empirically
the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS A: FSAs economic performance depends upon
their choice of supply-oriented strategy, concerning especially the
number of aircraft and destinations (quantitative variables) as well
as (qualitative) variables such as the level of comfort, measured
by passenger load factor. 
HYPOTHESIS B: Competitiveness depends upon cost reducing
efficiencies, which lower costs. For FSAs the latter rely mainly on
labour and fuel. On the one hand, difficulties in negotiating job
contracts and reaching agreement between employees’ representat-
ives and airlines managers (especially if the airline is not fully
privatised) result in high labour costs; on the other hand, fuel
costs cannot be easily reduced, crucially in the short term, when
the number and the type of aircraft in the fleet is given.
It might be argued that an increase in the economic perfor-
mances of FSAs represents an encouraging response to liberali-
sation policies: FSAs can coexist together with LCCs without los-
ing significant market share, while, at the same time, increasing
their competitiveness. 
LCCs are exploring a market segment that has been growing
(in particular because of demand for leisure travel). Customers
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travelling for leisure might be attracted by low fares and the
possibility of reaching new destinations, often through point-to-
point connections, as well as the same destinations as served by
FSAs. 
FSAs face a hard task to beat the increasing competition with
LCCs. Although in principle, the market segments served by FSAs
and LCCs might seem distinct: the former operating for business
customers with hub-and-spoke connections, the latter mostly
serving leisure travellers and only some of the traditional
destinations served by FSAs. However, this distinction in market
segments is increasingly blurred by LCC network expansion. 
3. - Results
Several models have been estimated using a fixed effects
approach.
EBIT, a proxy for economic performance, is always the
dependent variable. In the first regression, independent variables
are: lagged fixed assets; passenger load factors; total number of
aircraft; number of domestic, intra-European and inter-continental
destinations.
Results can be seen in Tables 2a, 2b and 2c.
We observe a negative effect of the variable fixed assets. More-
over, the estimated coefficient is highly significant: this result
could imply that an investment policy focussed only on infra-
structures does not have a positive impact on economic perfor-
mance. This supports the argument that investment policies
should be better planned, including, for example, process innovat-
ions (perhaps to explore ways to offer services of higher quality
to passengers).
Economic performance and the number of employees is,
unexpectedly, positively correlated: given high labour costs, one
might expect revenues to increase once employee numbers have
been reduced. This result could rely on the fact that airlines with
the highest revenues face fewer pressures on employment levels
and, consequently, labour costs. An increase in employee numbers
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could be a good strategy choice, if this allows FSAs to offer a
better customer service. Furthermore, a reduction in the number
of employees might signal a critical phase for the company, and
hence negative economic performance.
It is not possible to evaluate the effect of load factor, which,
in the economic literature, is considered as a key performance
indicator in the airline industry. In our analysis, we did not find
that variable to be significant; in another specification, not report-
ed here, total load factor (which also includes cargo) was consider-
ed. Compared to the passenger load factor, this is positively
correlated, but again not significant.
Load factor was not considered in the second specification of
the model: here, significant variables such as number of aircraft
and number of destinations were differentiated according to a
broad division by type of aircraft used (Airbus, Boeing, other
aircraft) and type of destinations (domestic, intra-European and
overseas).
In our second estimation, number of aircrafts (Airbus, Boeing,
others) shows almost always a positive coefficient, significantly
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TABLE 2.a
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL (1ST SPECIFICATION)
R2: within = 0.9960; Corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.1246
between = 0.7376; F(6,55) = 2279.18
overall = 0.9576 Prob > F = 0.0000
Variable Coefficients Std. Error t-ratio
Lagged fixed assets -.6022536*** .0051625 -116.66
No. of employees 16.316 14.949 1.09
Passengers load factor -386.006 1212.027 -0.32
Total no. of aircraft 8915.111* 4686.499 1.90
Total no. of destinations -7669.904** 3148.644 -2.44
Alliances 468335.4* 271929.4 1.72
Constant 1983679** 903987.1 2.19
*** = significant at 99% sigma_u 2305499.2
** = significant at 95% sigma_e 749156.3
* = significant at 90% rho .904496 
F test that all u_i=0: F(9,55) = 23.13;
Prob > F = 0.0000
correlated with earnings: this positive factor on performance levels
should be considered together with the fact that the number of
destinations (domestic and European) has a negative influence on
performance. As far as the number of destinations is concerned,
only domestic destinations are significant and show a higher effect
compared with other routes.
These results suggest that passengers appreciate a higher
frequency of flights on a given route. This circumstance would
lead us to conclude that airlines should deploy more aircraft on
well-known routes, thus serving traditional routes with higher
frequencies rather than developing new routes, whose effects could
be that of increasing total costs.
It would be interesting to add further specifications about the
type of aircraft used by airlines. The distinction we have made
regarding Airbus, Boeing and other aircraft is based on the
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2007
116
TABLE 2.b
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL (2ND SPECIFICATION)
R2: within = 0.9970; Corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.2107
between = 0.7460; F(9,55) = 2044.34
overall = 0.9519 Prob > F = 0.0000
Variable Coefficients Std. Error t-ratio
Lagged fixed assets -.5981786*** .0045705 -130.88
No. of employees 17.323 12.973 1.34
No. of aircraft (Airbus) 19502.64** 9436.584 2.07
No. of aircraft (Boeing) 6461.744 9855.009 0.66
No. of aircraft (others) 8086.321* 4942.987 1.64
No. of destinations 
(domestic) -86465.22*** 19289.51 -4.48
No. of destinations 
(European) -8989.961 8917.723 -1.01
No. of destinations 
(overseas) 6.624 5909.765 0.02
Alliances 219301.6 333695.9 0.66
Constant 2671334*** 955192.6 2.80
*** = significant at 99% sigma_u 2467142.7
** = significant at 95% sigma_e 646194.42
* = significant at 90% rho .93580195
F test that all u_i=0: F(9,55) = 4.79;
Prob > F = 0.0001
manufacturer of the major aircraft models: it is not sensitive to
the differences between various aircraft, which is described better
by considering the length of fuselage, engine size, etc. (Kilpi,
2007). 
The findings also suggest that there is no need for more
domestic destinations in order to achieve a better economic
outcome: for short-haul flights, the same aircraft can be used for
round trips (an example is provided by Ryanair’s business model).
An increase in the aircraft numbers would allow higher flight
frequencies on medium-haul (i.e. intra-European) destinations.
This evidence confirms the statement that an important part
of the service offered by a company is the convenience created
through fully flexible tickets and high flight frequencies. High
frequencies can be developed on spoke routes, employing smaller
aircraft (a strategy traditionally available to FSAs): the use of a
hub, with feed traffic from spokes, allows more flights for a given
traffic density and cost level. More flights reduce the total trip
time and increase flexibility (Gillen - Morrison, 2005). According
to our analysis, this could be true for intra-European and overseas
destinations, but not for domestic connections.
The analysis also supports the argument that fleet composit-
ion of an airline is important in affecting its operational perfor-
mance. Seristö - Vepsäläinen (1997) suggest that a uniform fleet
generally leads to better financial results. The challenge of airline
management in fleet planning is aimed at allowing a wider choice
of aircraft for different routes: moreover, growth in the airline in-
dustry brings with it a wider range of available aircraft types
(Kilpi, 2007).
De Borges Pan - Espirito Santo Jr. (2004) developed an index
suitable for comparing the composition of different aircraft fleets.7
In recent years, the uniformity of airline fleets has been steadily
decreasing, while the average fleet scale has been steadily in-
creasing. The authors observe how, during an economic boom,
airline fleets expand in size and variety, showing more diversity
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7 However, their “Fleet Standardization Index” only takes into account the
variety of the fleet and ignores its size, thus allowing comparisons between airlines
of very different sizes.
in their composition and increasing their scale. This happens as
new aircraft are taken into fleets in order to replace older ones.
During an economic downturn, airlines retire or park older air-
craft, thus adjusting their capacity to better meet the new situa-
tion: this increases uniformity if aircraft types leave the fleet en-
tirely and decreases scale when the number of aircraft decreases.
In order to test this hypothesis, in the last specification, we
introduced a dummy variable assuming value = 1 if the FSA is
characterised by heterogeneity in the fleet composition (Airbus,
Boeing and other aircraft) and = 0 otherwise.
This coefficient is not significantly correlated, so perhaps
another index of heterogeneity should be introduced; however, in
accordance with the paper by De Borges Pan - Espirito Santo Jr.
(2004), negative correlation could be an indicator that the airline
transport market is in an economic downturn phase. 
Fleet composition should be adjusted, increasing the number
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TABLE 2.c
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL (3RD SPECIFICATION)
R2-sq: within = 0.9965; Corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.2288
between = 0.5977; F(9,55) = 2325.70
overall = 0.9238 Prob > F = 0.0000
Variable Coefficients Std. Error t-ratio
Lagged fixed assets -.5974174*** .0049205 -121.41
No. of employees 26.270** 13.128 2.00
Fleet heterogeneity -238129.2 288097.1 -0.83
No. of destinations 
(domestic) -81752.5*** 20874.62 -3.92
No. of destinations 
(European) -4263.785 9097.683 -0.47
No. of destinations 
(overseas) -5133.663 5864.641 -0.88
Alliances 612892.6** 268095.3 2.29
Constant 3892000*** 735504.3 5.29
*** = significant at 99% sigma_u 3188523.7
** = significant at 95% sigma_e 686790.79
* = significant at 90% rho .95566221
F test that all u_i=0: F(9,57) = 29.81;
Prob > F = 0.0000
of aircraft likely to cover long-haul flights. No-frills airlines (i.e.
LCCs) are gaining a consistently increasing substantial share of
the intra-European market. The negative correlation of domestic
flights with successful performance, suggests how, in local
markets, price rather than convenience has become a driver of
consumer choice (especially for those passengers travelling for
leisure). 
Generally, airlines operating on a high number of routes at
high frequencies are more successful than those companies
operating on a small number of destinations with low frequencies.
A decision to increase flight frequency on a given route, however,
has to take into account whether the estimated demand is likely
to generate revenues to cover marginal costs; finally, there might
be scale economies and/or network externalities.
4. - Conclusions
The purpose of the analysis in this paper was to highlight
some factors that might have an influence in determining FSAs’
economic performance after liberalisation in the European air
transport market.
We wanted to test two hypotheses: 
1) The success of FSAs after liberalisation depends on the
choices made by companies to enhance a supply-oriented strategy;
this means mainly increasing the number of aircraft and destinat-
ions. 
According to the results obtained, rather than increasing the
number of aircraft, FSAs should adjust the composition of their
fleets. Long-haul destinations should be the main focus for FSAs,
and domestic destinations do not appear to be profitable (this
might be due to a high level of competition on these routes).
Load factors (both total load factors and passenger load factor)
do not appear significant in explaining economic performance.
Customer satisfaction indicators were not considered and this
could be a good point for further research.
2) A strategy for enhancing companies’ competitiveness relies
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on efficiency increases, and, hence, on a reduction in the level of
costs, the latter depending mainly on labour and fuel. 
A reduction in the number of employees is not associated with
a reduction in costs. A high number of employees is positively
correlated to successful economic performance, whereas invest-
ments in fixed assets do not appear to exert a ‘positive’ effect on
economic performance.
Some final remarks can be outlined. 
First of all, competition might not be on a level paying field
because of subsidies that some companies receive from govern-
ments at different levels (AEA, 2003). This applies to FSAs as well
as LCCs, although subsidization takes different forms and might
follow a number of ways (for instance, LCCs might receive sub-
sidies from airports, whereas stated-owned FSAs might get finan-
cial assistance from the national government). In a broader per-
spective, the analysis might include institutional variables related
to the financing of companies and to the role of public sector in
supporting FSAs. 
Secondly, airline companies have to take into account effi-
ciency in airports. 
Last, future analysis could compare economic performance
after liberalisation (i.e. in the period between 1997 and 2002) and
after the year 2002 (when many companies have experienced a
downturn in their level of revenues). However, such a comparison
is still premature, given the lack of available information.8
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8 A considerable change could take place in the next future. In fact, after more
than four years of negotiations between EU countries and the US, the Open Skies
Agreement has recently been signed. Such agreement will open up the lucrative
transatlantic flight market by April 2008. It allows EU airlines to fly from any city
in Europe to one in the US, while in turn airports in the EU are opened up to
US companies. According to European Commission Jacques Barrot, the agreement
has the potential to pave the way for cheaper fares, add an extra 26 million
passengers to the route and create 80,000 new jobs. Therefore, the agreement could
be worth € 12 billion (www.europarl.europa.eu).
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